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Albertus Magnus and the Emergence of late Medieval 
Intellectualism
Albertus Magnus was at the head of the late medieval Latin reception of 
both the near-totality of the esoteric texts of Aristotle and of the Arab thought 
that accompanied it (the Aristoteles arabus)1, as well as of many Neoplatonic 
sources that were greatly influenced by Aristotle’s thought2, and he welcomed all 
this wealth without prejudice, very likely given his strong demarcation between 
religion and philosophy. An important feature of this «tradition» was an elaborate 
reflection on the intellect, the νοῦς, human or divine, forming the theoretical body 
we today call noetics, and knowledge of Aristotle’s treatise on the soul, the De 
Anima, and of the Neoplatonic and Arab thought rooting in it, sparked an intense 
speculation on the nature and role of the human intellect.
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1   If it is true that by the end of the 12th century the majority of Aristotle’s works had already been 
translated, comprising the corpus vetustius, there seems to have been little interest in them until the 
middle of the 13th century, when the situation radically changed due to a great extent to Albertus 
Magnus’ influence, calling for new translations and editions that would eventually constitute 
the corpus recentius (for a short but detailed account of the translations of Aristotle’s works in 
the later Middle Ages, see for instance B. G. DoD, «Aristoteles Latinus», in N. Kretzmann, A. 
Kenny & J. Pinborg (eds.), The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge 1982, pp. 45-79).  
2   The notable case is the Liber de causis, mostly a compilation in Arab of passages from Proclus’ 
Elementatio theologica; the Aristotelian influence was indeed so great that this work was known 
as Liber Aristotelis de expositione bonitatis purae, before Aquinas discovered its source.
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Concerning this, Albert’s commentary on the Metaphysics gives us an eluci-
dation: as for the former, it is something divine (divinum quiddam3) in man, and 
this precisely because its role is one of «joining» itself with the divine intellect, 
cause and light of all beings and things known (causa et lumen omnium entium et 
scitorum4), in order to acquire their forms. Both the Peripatetics and the Neopla-
tonists had emphasized the divine or super-natural character of the intellect; both 
had postulated intelligible forms in it that allowed of cognition of reality; light 
had always been a favorite analogy to explain the way in which the agent intellect, 
or the νοῦς ποιητικός, transmitted the forms, or species, to the possible intellect; 
what is new is the «synthesis» (perhaps a «fusion» would render it better) between 
all these elements and Albert’s Latin background, as well as an explicit «scienti-
fic» interest in the intellect, thus getting rid of the mystical overtones of many of 
his predecessors. Also interesting — and most importantly — is the fact that for 
him the intellect is not only the act of the soul, but its very essence5. 
When Albert got in touch with the Arab noetics rooting in the Aristotelian 
dichotomy between the agent and the possible intellects6 what he had in his hands 
was an already quite elaborate hierarchy of kinds or degrees of the intellect that 
accounted for the different levels of actualization, from mere potency to entelechy; 
in other words, they accounted for the different degrees of knowledge, from 
the mere bodily sensible structure to a complete body of apodictic knowledge 
totally independent from the body and the material world, and they did so in 
a perspective whereby the body was not discarded in the cognitive processes7. 
3   Cf. Metaphysica I, 1, 1, ed. B. geyer, Opera Omnia XVI/I, Aschendorff, Münster 1960, p. 2 
(throughout this paper, pages and editions of primary sources are indicated only when necessary).
4   Cf. Met. I, 1, 5, p. 7. Note the important distinction in Albertus Magnus, and in Scholasticism 
in general, between lumen and lux; briefly, and very generally, lux refers to the source of light 
or to its essence, whereas lumen refers to the medium through which lux appears or manifests 
itself. Thus, in noetics, whereas lux is the essence of the agent intellect, lumen can be seen as the 
intellectual forms or species it contains in itself. Cf. for instance Albertus Magnus’ De unitate 
intellectus 3, 1 (ed. A. Hufnagel, Opera Omnia XVII 1, Aschendorff, Münster 1975, p. 22): 
Sicut autem lumen solis se habet ad colores, ita quod non nisi sub actu lucis abstracti videntur, 
ita etiam est de formis imaginatis et in sensitivis acceptis ad lumen intellectus agentis. Contrast 
with his Met. XI, 1, 9, ed. B. geyer, Opera Omnia XVI/II, Aschendorff, Münster 1964, p. 473: 
«Quae lux intellectus est substantia ipsius intellectus […]».  
5   Met. II, 1, 9, p. 472: «Supponimus enim intellectum agentem partem esse animae et esse formam 
humanae animae […]». 
6  Cf. De anima III, 5.
7   Cf. Avicenna, Liber de anima seu sextus de naturalibus V, 6, ed. van riet, Louvain 1968, p. 149: 
«Dum anima humana generaliter est in corpore, non potest recipere intelligentiam agentem subito».
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The first tripartite hierarchy by Alexander of Aphrodisias8 became gradually more 
complex and Avicenna, starting from Alfarabi’s already complex division9, came 
up with the following hierarchy10 that would be the basis for Albert’s own:
1.  Material intellect (intellectus materialis), or intellect in absolute potency: 
like first matter, it is the potency to receive all forms;
2.  Intellect in habitu, or in possible potency: the intellect that has already 
received the first intelligibles, or the first principles such as «the whole is 
bigger than the part» and «things equal to another are themselves equal 
to each other»; it is in act (in effectu) in relation to the material intellect;
3.  Intellect in act (in effectu), or in perfecting potency (in potentia 
perfectiva): 
  3.1.   Intellectus accommodatus: not only does it know the intelligible 
forms, but it also knows that it knows;
  3.2.   Intellectus adeptus: it thinks whatever it wants to without making 
the effort of acquiring the intelligible forms;
    Intellectus sanctus: an almost immediate contact with the agent intellect; 
a sort of prophetic spirit;
5.  Agent intellect (intellectus agens), or in absolute act (in effectu absoluto): 
the giver of the forms; all the natural forms are to be found in it, from 
where they eternally emanate as an expression of its being.
Albertus Magnus accepted this hierarchy, but he operated two major changes: 
firstly, his intellectus adeptus did not merely represent an «automatic» increase in 
actuality, but it was the fruit of an act of contemplation and of a conscious effort; this 
was thus an ethical turn in the Aristotle-inspired noetics, and an important change 
(Alain de Libera sees it as the fundamental thesis transmitted to the Dominican 
school of the 13th-14th centuries11); secondly–and more fundamentally–, he 
8   1. Intellectus materialis (νοῦς ὑλικός); 2. Intellectus in habitu (νοῦς καθ’ ἑÏξιν); 3. Intelligentia 
agens (νοῦς ποιητικός). See E. gilson, Les sources gréco-arabes de l’augustinisme avicennisant, 
reprint Vrin, Paris 1981, p. 7-ff., for a synopsis.
9  Cf. ibid., p. 27-38.
10   Cf. Liber de anima I, 5, ed. van riet, Louvain 1972, p. 96-100; ibid., V, 5, p. 127; ibid., 6, ed. van 
riet, 1968, p. 148-9; ibid., pp. 151-153. 
11  Cf. A. de libera, La philosophie médiévale, PUF, Paris 1998, p. 399.
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rejected the Arab doctrine of the separateness of the intellect, according to which 
there was only one agent intellect shared by the entire humankind12: if the Arab 
noetics had its origin in a cosmology of intelligences supporting an emanational 
metaphysics (the agent intellect was the 10th and last sphere in a hierarchy of 
celestial intelligences in what was an Arab innovation13; it was completely 
separate and its expression was the emanation of the intelligible forms), the 
Christian noetics could not dispense with such elements as the likeness between 
creature and creator, the immortality of the human soul, the moral responsibility 
of each individual concerning her/his thoughts, all aspects extremely difficult to 
conciliate with a doctrine that could be interpreted as implying that the individual 
man does not think. However, it was not against all Arab philosophers that Albert 
spoke, but against Averroes, who had concluded that not only the agent, but also 
the possible intellect was separate14. 
This «democratization» of knowledge in the claim that each individual 
possesses all the different stages or degrees of the intellect—and thus of 
knowledge—and the highly intellectualist «psychology» in the postulation of the 
intellect as the essence of the soul make of Albert of Cologne the true father of an 
intellectualist turn in the 13th century that would later become the trademark of 
Dietrich of Freiberg and Eckhart of Hochheim. But in his own case, and contrary 
to that of these, this intellectualism did not give origin to an idealism: there are 
things in the world, independent from the human mind15, and the process of 
12   Besides in the De unit. intell.(op. cit.), Albert elaborates on this in other places; e.g.: De XV 
problematibus I, ed. B. geyer, Opera omnia XVII 1, Aschendorff, Münster 1975. 
13   Cf. H.A. DaviDson, Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroës, on Intellect, Oxford University Press, 
New York – Oxford 1992, p. 18.
14   Cf. Commentarium magnum in Aristotelis De Anima libros III, comm. 19, transl. in A. de 
libera, L’intelligence et la pensée, 2nd ed., GF-Flammarion, Paris 1998, p. 109ff. Two aspects 
need clarification concerning this issue (for details, see Alain de Libera’s Introduction to his 
translation of Aquinas’ De unitate intellectus contra Auerroistas, GF-Flammarion, Paris 1997): 
Albert did not speak against Latin Averroism, his references to the auerroistae beginning only 
after 1270, date after which he wrote his Summa of Theology, and, as shown by de Libera, he 
actually defended Averroes by showing that there were two senses to the word ‘separate’: the first 
sense was that of separation from matter (nec est corpus nec virtus in corpore), and in this case 
Averroes was perfectly right, while the second sense was that of separation from all particular 
things, and he could not attribute such a radical sense to him; either way, Averroes was rescued 
(cf. Albertus Magnus, De unit. intell., 3, p. 30; ibid., p. 24).
15   Cf. Metaph., I, 4, 8, vol. XVI/I, p. 57: «Ens autem scimus esse causatum primum causae primae 
et sic non esse commune causae et causato, sed potius ante omnem entis divisionem est haec 
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cognition of reality does not dispense with the senses16 even if these are far from 
allowing of true knowledge: 
In omni enim communi hominibus sensibili cognitione universale confusum et mixtum 
sensibilibus secundum sensum notius est […]. Et hoc non est principium artis et scientiae, 
secundum quod sic singularibus permixtum est, sed potius prout est ad rationem simplicem et 
causam deductum per depurationem. Aliter enim in singularibus adhuc confusum obumbratum 
est ex materiae appendiciis et variabile secundum esse et non potest esse perfectae et certae 
cognitionis principium. 
Aristotle, Metaphysica I, 1, 10, p. 15
Let us concentrate on these epistemic aspects, in order to verify in which way 
Albert’s realism might have propelled an intellectualist «movement». First of all, 
and as already seen, he individualized thought, prompting the making of what we 
today call a «subject», namely in cognitive terms. Doing this, he also fomented 
the emergence of a more precise concept of «object of knowledge»; with this 
«epistemologically» clearer distinction between the subject and the object of 
knowledge, epistemology leaves its subordinate position regarding a specifically 
theological metaphysics, ultimately imposing itself over metaphysics tout court in 
the idealist core that follows Albert’s intellectualism. This is the same as to say that 
he promoted the independence of epistemology as a «scientific» field of study. His 
ontological realism allowed of an intellectualist movement precisely due to this 
independence—a relative one, clearly—of epistemology from metaphysics. More 
specifically, he did this inside the problem of universals, which, since Abelard 
in the 12th century, had been in a state of dormancy, and the next step is thus to 
show in which way, rekindling this problem, he allowed the germination of an 
«epistemological» idealism within an «ontological realism».
But first of all I should like to clarify that Albert is not the father of a «new», 
or «renewed» noetics, as sometimes claimed17: he did not really change the noetic 
divisio : ens a seipso et ens ab alio. Also ibid., VII, 5, 7, p. 383: […] ostendimus ens non relative 
dici ad intellectum vel sensum, sed potius e converso».
16   E.g.: De unit. intell., III, §2, p. 27: «Omnia enim materialia corporalia subiciuntur talibus [non-
localibus] et sunt passiva respectu eorum, et virtus intelligentiae penetrat ea, nec reguntur ab ipsa 
; et quod hoc non est ab intellectu nostro, hoc est ideo, quia non efficitur in actu nisi ex acceptis 
a sensu, et ideo quod impedit sensum, per accidens impedit intellectum». 
17   E.g.: E. Weber, «Eckhart et l’ontothéologie: Histoire et conditions d’une rupture», in E. Zum 
brunn et al., Maître Eckhart à Paris: Une critique médiévale de l’ontothéologie, PUF, Paris 
1984, pp. 30-31.
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doctrines he «synthesized», these being those of Aristotle, Plotinus, Dionysius the 
Areopagite, and of the Arab philosophers, and to speak of a «renewed» noetics 
in his case is to forget that these and other predecessors (e.g.: Abelard18) had, 
long before him, begun to defend–or to suggest the defence of–the supremacy 
of the mind over being. If one can speak of a «renewed» noetics in the late 
Middle Ages, this is due to the simultaneous «appearance» of Aristotle and his 
Arab commentators, who showed that a transcendent epistemology not only did 
not account for knowledge of reality, but also separated man from the Christian 
god; Albert, Aquinas, and even Bonaventure, would thus reject an abyss between 
the knowing subject and the things known in favor of the absolute character 
of knowledge founded on an immanentism that allowed of a likeness, or unity, 
between both poles of the cognitive process. If Bonaventure opted for an 
«expressionism» to save some of the transcendence apparently required in matters 
of faith, both Albert and his disciples clearly separated philosophy from theology 
when, paradoxically, they affirmed the immanent character of the verb.
Back to Albert and to the problem of universals. Firstly, this problem amoun-
ted to a very clear-cut–though far from simple–issue: are the universals (the ideas, 
or forms; the genus, species, and difference) actual things (res), or mere intellec-
tual artifacts, namely names (nomina)? This originated in Aristotle’s critique of 
Plato’s ideas, namely concerning their separate character: in spite of the fact that 
the Stagirite did not entirely get rid of the Platonic ideas, because he needed the 
universal for knowledge of the particular (though this is not existentially reduci-
ble to the universal19, and despite his refusal to accept such knowledge in other 
passages20), he rejected that they could be substances, separate from the particular 
things; if they were so, this would render them utterly useless for cognition21. 
The truth is that Plato «disappeared» almost completely from the philosophical 
landscape (that is, practically all of his texts did), and the problem of universals 
seemed to have only one source: Aristotle. But this was mere appearance, because 
18   I have here in mind his (in)famous distinction between the modus subsistendi and the modus 
intelligendi or significandi, which would allow the intellect the conception of roses even in case 
there were none; cf. Logica «ingredientibus», Glossae super Porphyrium, in Peter Abaelards 
philosophische Schriften, I, ed. B. geyer, Aschendorf, Münster in Westfalen 1919, p. 30
19  Cf. Met. A, 1, 981a20-4.
20  Cf. De anima II, 5, 417b16-23.
21  Cf. Met. A, 9, 992a24-32.
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contrary to the main issue of the universals, which balanced between the «abso-
lute» reality of the universals and their solely mental «reality», the Stagirite had 
claimed that they were… both! And, if one decides to let in yet another stance 
somehow intermediary between those of the realists (the reales) and of the nomi-
nalists (the nominales), to wit, the conceptualists, he will satisfy all three22. 
But, even more importantly, Aristotle’s universals did not have much to 
do with those of the medieval philosophers, simply because his had mainly an 
«epistemic» function; they answered the question how we know things: because 
both the knowing subject and the thing known share the same intelligible form, 
immanent both to the thing and to the subject’s soul, in act in the agent intellect, 
«awaken» in the possible one. This epistemic function is very much clearly 
expounded in his Metaphysics: 
Experience is born in men out of memory; in fact, the many memories of the same thing 
acquire the strength of an experience. And it seems that experience is something almost like 
science and art, these originating in men through the former. Indeed, experience created art, 
according to Polus, rightly speaking, and inexperience fortune. Art originates when out of many 
observations of experience a universal opinion (μία καθόλου ὑπόληψις) is formed. 
Aristotle, Met. A, 1, 980b28-981a7 (my transl.)
It is from experience, from the repeated remembering of the perception of a 
thing or event, that the universal «is born» in the soul: the accent on the epistemic 
function of the universal is evident; it is posterior to the first perception of a thing, 
and the process that gives origin to it is induction (ἐπαγογή), an epistemic «tool» 
par excellence23. Metaphysical considerations are not altogether absent, since he 
claims that the universal contributes to the very knowledge of being (by attaining 
its λόγος or ὁρισμός, the definition24), but one can hardly claim that it has the 
main role. 
It so happened that the emphasis given to the problem since its very beginning 
with Porphyry and throughout its perpetuation up to the later Middle Ages was 
«ontological». It is quite true that Porphyry tells the reader that the question of 
knowing what genus, species, difference, property, and accident are, is important 
to give definitions as well as to divide and demonstrate25, i.e. to know, but he 
22  E.g.: Alain de libera, La querelle des universaux, Ed. du Seuil, Paris 1996, p. 71.
23  Cf. Anal. Post. II, 19, 100a15-100b5.
24  Cf. Met. Z, 4, 1030a6-7.
25  Cf. Isagoge 1.
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26  Cf. E. gilson, La philosophie au moyen âge, 2nd ed., Ed. Payot, Paris 1947, p. 284.
27   Put somehow differently by de Libera,  La querelle, op. cit., p. 177: «Avicenne affronte directe-
ment le problème pendant de l’aristotélisme: lier la doctrine empiriste de Métaphysique, A, 1 à 
la doctrine du νοῦς, l’‘intuition intellectuelle’, qui complète la série de l’‘induction abstractive’ 
dans les Seconds Analytiques, II, 19».
28  Avicenna, Liber de philosophia prima V, 1, ed. van riet, Louvain 1980, p. 228.
29  Cf. ibid.
does it so that one can learn the doctrine expounded in the Categories, Aristotle’s 
— main — ontological text. And thus it is the second paragraph of the Isagoge, 
of an almost ontological tone («what is the being of the universal?»), that really 
initiates the problem and hands it to the medieval world. To this ontological cargo, 
the logical weight characteristic of the high Middle Ages is added by Boethius, 
and with Abelard, to whom the universality is no more than the logical function 
of some words, as put by Gilson26, the problem of universals becomes ultimately 
an onto-logical problem. 
It was precisely Albertus Magnus who redirected the problem to its 
Aristotelian epistemological roots, and he did it by distancing himself from the 
logicism of the Parisians, and by following in the footsteps of Avicenna, who 
firstly had linked the epistemological problem in Aristotle to his noetics27.  
For Avicenna, the universal is an intention (intentio, translating the Arab 
terms ma‘qûl and ma‘nâ), the «tension» of thought towards an object, or, put more 
simply, what one wants to say. What one wants to say of a thing has nothing to do 
with its existence: for him, this is an accident of the essence, i.e. the quiddity of a 
thing (its «thingness», its quid expressed in its definition answering the question 
quid sit, what it is) does not entail its quoddity (its existence, its anitas, or the 
answer to the question an sit, whether it is). In the same way that one distinguishes 
between essence and existence, one has to separate the intention of «thingness» 
of a thing, i.e. its being one, a unity, from its universal character as being a unity 
in plurality; and in the same way that the existence is an accident of the essence, 
universality is an accident of the universal: the universal in itself is neither one 
nor multiple, horseness being nothing more than horseness (equinitas non est nisi 
equinitas tantum)28: it is the intellect that attributes to it this character of unity in 
the plurality29. 
Given this, the function of the intellect is that of abstracting the universals, or 
the second intentions, intentiones secundae, from the first intentions, intentiones 
primae, the concepts or representations of things. This is for him man’s most 
distinguishing feature:
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Quae autem est magis propria ex proprietatibus hominis, haec est scilicet formare 
intentiones universales intelligibiles omnino abstractas a materia, sicut iam declaravimus, et 
procedere ad sciendum incognita ex cognitis intelligibilibus credendo et formando.
Avicenna, Liber de anima V, 1, p. 76
 
Thus, Avicenna’s essence is first and foremost «logical», but it has an 
«epistemic» function, since it is through it that one gets to know reality; therefore, 
it also has a «metaphysical» function: logic «captures», or «expresses» reality, 
because the intentio secunda, or universal, «expresses» the unity and sameness 
of an essence, regardless of the particular thing that possesses it30. This said, 
each particular thing is an object of knowledge, and the universals are objects of 
logic, and it is this knowledge of the particular, which expresses its essence, that 
is metaphysics proper.
However, this is not idealism, even if it seems that epistemology altogether 
replaces metaphysics; much on the contrary, the intentiones have their origin in 
the real thing independent of the mind of the knowing subject, more specifically 
in its nature or certitudo (Arab haqîqa), a property of the thing itself and not 
of the subject’s, like the «subjective certitude» of modern philosophy, as de 
Libera points out31. However, there is «already» undoubtedly an «intellectualist 
emphasis», because the thing is not known in itself, but only through a process of 
universalization—still better: «cataloguing»—in the mind, the only way humans 
know a particular thing, and this makes me bracket de Libera’s opinion: can 
one actually ever speak of «essence» without a subject? It is, after all, a logical 
property, or modality, and therefore necessarily belonging to the mind of the 
knowing subject. To use a more technical terminology, the certitudo propria of 
a thing, or its esse proprium, does not, in logico-epistemological terms, dispense 
with its esse affirmativum. Moreover, that in this context knowledge becomes 
wholly independent of existence corroborates this hypothesis of an intellectualist 
turn far more radical than Aristotle’s: after all, for this there can only be knowledge 
of an existing thing; in other words, the essence, the quid est, is always of a quod 
est, a particular thing that actually is32.
Albert expresses this Aristotelian-inspired intellectualism in the formula 
30  See for example E. gilson, La philosophie au Moyen Age, op. cit., p. 351.
31  Cf. La querelle, op. cit., p. 201.
32   Cf. Met. Γ, 2, 1003b26-7:  ταὐτὸ γὰρ εἷς ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἄνθρωπος, καὶ ὢν ἄνθρωποςκαὶ ἄνθρωπος 
(A man and man is the same thing, and an existing man is the same thing as man).
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veritas est adaequatio rei ad intellectum33, truth is the adequacy of a thing to 
the intellect (or to the concept, which is the same)! This is the statement that, 
«if» the essence of a thing is its «truth», then there is no esse proprium without 
an esse affirmativum, there is no true thing in the world without the mind. We 
are now ready to establish the connection between this «epistemologized» 
metaphysics and Albert’s participation in the problem of universals. His starting 
point is Avicenna and his tripartition of the universals in «states», of Neoplatonic 
origin34: the universals before the multiplicity (ante multiplicitatem), in the 
multiplicity (in multiplicitate), and after the multiplicity (postquam fuerint in 
multiplicitate)35. The first state corresponds to the Neoplatonic πρὸ τῶν πολλῶν, 
before the multiplicity, and it is the universal in god, i.e. the verb; in the second 
state, the universal is ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς, literally: in the many, and it is obviously the 
universal in the multiple things in nature that share it; in this state, it is a discretio 
and a dispositio, a mere disposition that prepares the intention. Finally, the third 
state of the universal, ἐπὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς, after the many, is the state that matters 
epistemically the most: salient is the fact that the universal becomes epistemically 
valid for us only after having been in the multiplicity, which might imply a strong 
realism, had Avicenna not warned that in that state it is merely a disposition to the 
creation of an intention in the mind; the intellectualist «twist» is evident again. 
Together with Eustratus of Nicea’s «wholes» (ante partes, in partibus, ex 
33   Liber de praedicamentis II, ed. borgnet in Opera Omnia I, L. Vivès, Paris 1890, pp. 192-3: Ad 
hoc autem quod dicitur in adaequatione intellectus vel conceptus ad signum quod conceptum 
significat, dicendum quod conceptus vel intellectus vel opinio vel quocumque modo dici possit 
id quod est in anima (cujus voces prolatae signa sunt) non absolvitur a rebus quae sunt causa 
conceptuum: et ideo illis prout conceptae sunt res adaequatur: non enim sermo inventus est ad 
significandum conceptum fictum, qui non est nisi in concipiente, quia sermo inutilis esset, quia 
per sermonem audiens nullam de re conciperet veritatem vel significationem. Et ideo dictum 
Pythagorae et Heracliti non habet veritatem: quia dixerunt, quod verum est in apprehendendo 
vel opinando secundum quod opinio est opinantis passio: sed hoc verum est, quod verum est 
in opinando vel concipiendo secundum quod conceptus vel opinio est rei significatae aequata 
passio vel conceptio: et ideo sermo talis conceptui aequatus, aequatus est etiam rei: et ideo dicit 
Aristoteles quod veritas est adaequatio rei ad intellectum.
34   E.g.: the commentaries on Porphyry’s Isagoge by Ammonius (In Porphyrii Isagogen sive V 
voces, ed. A. busse [Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca (CAG) IV, 3], G. reimer, Berlin 1891), 
David (Prolegomena et in Porphyrii Isagogen Commentarium, ed. A. busse [CAG XVIII, 2], G. 
reimer, Berlin 1904), and Elias In Porphyrii Isagogen et Aristotelis Categorias Commentaria, 
ed. A. busse [CAG XVIII, 1], G. reimer, Berlin 1900).
35  Cf. Avicenna, Logica, Venice, 1508, f. 12ra; ibid. f. 12va.
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partibus36), this is Albert’s starting point—and an avowed one, for that matter37, 
though he also attributed it to the ancient philosophers, namely to Plato38 —, and 
his tripartition39 in universals ante rem, or in the verb, in re, in things, and post 
rem, or in the human intellect, will remain until the end of the 15th century as a 
trademark of the via antiqua40. This tripartition was in fact not a new thing for 
the Neoplatonists themselves, but it had never been an explicit one before them: 
if Plato had seen the ideas as existing primarily πρὸ τῶν πολλῶν in a supernatural 
realm, it is not at all clear in him whether they were also in things, given that all 
we know is that the objects of the world «participate» in/of them, which does 
not necessarily mean that they are present in the things themselves; Aristotle 
was convinced that, as seen by Plato, they were completely transcendent, and 
he accordingly denied them any epistemic value41. But his placement of the 
universals is not characterized by clarity either: according to him, they are in 
things as their second essences, and they are in the agent intellect in act too; as for 
the possible intellect, this has them only in potency (though he «also» claims that 
the soul is the place of the ideas)42. 
This is what is new in Albert: while for Avicenna, following Aristotle, the 
universal can only become epistemically valid — as «after the multiplicity» — 
once transmitted to the human intellect by the «separate» agent intellect, which 
preserves Plato’s transcendence of the forms in relation both to things and to the 
human mind, Albert radically rejects this state of affairs: when he says that the 
universals post rem are in the human mind, he says that they are there precisely 
in as «pure» a state as they are in the divine mind (ante rem), not owing much 
to the universals in things (in re). As a matter of fact, given that man is endowed 
with the two kinds of intellect, the agent and possible, the first being the [likeness 
of the] intelligentia prima cognoscens et causans universale and the second the 
36   Cf. Eustratus, In Ethicam Nichomacheam Commentarius (trans. Robert Grosseteste), ed. H. P. F. 
mercKen, The Greek Commentaries on the Nichomachean Ethics of Aristotle I (Corpus Latinum 
Commentariorum in Aristotelem Graeca 6/1), Leyde 1973, p. 69.
37   Cf. Super Porphyrium de V universalibus IX, cap. 1, ed. M. S. noya, Opera Omnia I-1A, 
Aschendorff, Münster 2004, p. 144.
38   Cf. ibid. II, 3; Physica. I, I, 6, ed. P. HossfelD, Opera Omnia IV 1, Aschendorff, Münster 1987, 
p. 10; De anima I, I, 4, ed. C. stroicK, Opera Omnia VII-1, Aschendorff, Münster 1968, p. 8.
39  Cf. Super Porphyrium de V universalibus II, cap. 3.
40  For a detailed treatment of this question see Alain de Libera, La querelle, op. cit., pp. 253-ff.
41  Cf. Met. Z, 14.
42  Cf. De anima III, 8, 431b21: ἡ ψυχὴ τὰ ὄντα πώς ἐστι πάντα.
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intellectus cognoscens <sed> non causans, it is obvious that the universal post 
rem is in two different ways, one of which is in nothing different from the very 
universal ante rem. We thus have an identity between the universals post rem 
when they are in a relation to the first intelligence–an identity expressed in the 
formula radius et lumen43 intelligentiae agentis and which is in principle valid 
only for the act of knowledge–whereas we talk of abstraction when the universals 
post rem are in a relation to the things themselves or to the universals in re. The 
following diagram (Fig. 1) shows these relations as they are elaborated on in 
Super Porphyrium de V universalibus II, cap. 3:  
Fig. 1: Albertus Magnus’ Tripartition of the Universals
Briefly, never before Albertus Magnus had the universals so explicitly kept 
their «divine» character while at the same time being clearly placed also in the 
human mind. And this is the fruit of his intellectualism, as one can see by means 
of a comparison with the voluntarism opposing it: for Bonaventure, the question 
43  See what was said above concerning the distinction between lux and lumen. 




universale triplicem habet considerationem secundum quod
secundum relationem ad 
intellectum intelligentiae primae 
cognoscentis et causantis ipsum, 
cuius illa natura simplex radius 
quidem est:
accidit ipsi radium et lumen 
intelligentiae agentis esse 
et simplex et purum esse, et 
immateriale et immobile et 
incorporale et incorruptibile
ABSTRACTIONIDENTITY
secundum relationem ad 
intellectum per abstractionem 
cognoscentem ipsum: 
talis intellectus secundum quod 
abstrahit ipsum agit in ipso 
universalitatem (quam de natura 
sua ante habuit) per hoc quod 
separat ispum a materia et 
materialibus individuitatibus
et perfectibile
in se ipso est natura simplex et 
invariabilis:
ANTE REM:
universale simplex est natura, quae 
dat esse et rationem et nomen, et 
verissimum est inter omnia quae 
sunt, nihil habens alienae naturae 
admixtum, nec conditione alienae 
naturae admixtum
est in isto vel in illo:
IN RE:
multa accidunt ei secundum esse: 
est particulatum et individuatum, 
multiplicabile vel multiplicatum, 
incorporatum et habens in se 
diversas passiones quibus est 
subiectum et alia huiusmodi 
infinita, quia materiae infinita 
accidunt
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of the universals comprised two main elements, the universals in things and their 
«eternal notions», the universals in the verb, the notion of the universal not being 
entirely in the soul44. After Albert, the discussion revolves to a great extent around 
the universals in the human mind, which, in the act of knowledge, reestablishes 
the link between the universals in the verb and in things. One can truly say that 
epistemology gets the leading role in philosophical matters, and not even theology 
can impose itself upon it, as one of Albert’s disciples, Dietrich of Freiberg, will 
show by refusing to accept Aquinas’ suspension of reason, or nature, for the sake 
of faith45. As for Eckhart of Hochheim, though as far as we know he did not take 
a very active part in the problem of universals in the traditional way this was 
commonly approached46, he accepted Albert’s tripartition to make a bolder claim: 
there is no difference whatsoever between the universals ante rem and those post 
rem as «causes of things47». 
It is by means of this primacy of epistemology over metaphysics that Albert 
opens the door, perhaps paradoxically, to Ockham’s nominalism. The «perhaps» 
is meant to placate those who see a true antagonism between realism and 
nominalism, when in fact the main opposing parties in the problem of universals 
were all «realists» in the sense that they all believed in the «reality» of the 
universals, substantially or mentally so. Concerning Albert’s specific case, there 
is perhaps a too quick identification between his «metaphysical realism» and his 
«logical realism»: if the former is not altogether false, the latter is not completely 
watertight, because his universal post rem is certainly proof that he sees it as 
real enough–but as a mental content. Moreover, if the universal in re is to have 
something in common with those ante rem and post rem, of an apparently more 
logical character, then it cannot be some sort of «thing», challenging any radical 
44  Cf. Les six jours de la création, IV, 9 ; Paris 1991, pp. 176-7.
45   See for ex. Ruedi imbacH, «Pourquoi Thierry de Freiberg a-t-il critiqué Thomas d’Aquin?», 
Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie, 45 (1989) p. 128-9.
46   For Eckhart’s “unorthodox” participation in this problem, see L. M. augusto, «Eckhart’s Bilder», 
Princípios 15:24 (2008) 167-186.
47   Expositio libri Sapientiae, c. 1, n. 22, ed. J. KocH - H. fiscHer, Die lateinischen Werke II, W. 
Kohlhammer, Stuttgart 1992, p. 343: «Rerum creatarum rationes non sunt creatae, sed nec 
creabiles ut sic. Sunt enim ante rem et post rem, causa tamen originalis ipsarum rerum. Propter 
quod per ipsas res mutabiles cognoscuntur ut per causas et scientia immutabili, sicut patet in 
scientia naturalium. Res autem ipsa extra quantum ad esse suum formale mutabile est, creabile et 
creatum. Et hoc est quod hic dicitur: creavit deus, ut essent omnia. Res enim in ipso sunt rerum 
rationes, Ioh. 1: ‘in principio erat verbum’ sive logos, quod est ratio; et Augustinus [De trin. VI, 
c. 10, n. 11] dicit quod est ‘ars’ ‘plena rationum omnium’» (my emphasis).
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interpretations making of him, inside this problem, an impenitent realist. Thus it 
is precisely his logical realism that helps to shadow his ontological realism, and if 
the talk is of logical realism, one does not see how it differs from nominalism in 
the first place: the «nominalists» were all «logical realists» par excellence, given 
that they reduced the universal to a mere mental res. But, and more importantly, 
Albert seemed to be quite aware that he was eating the cake and keeping it by 
concocting a via media between the realists and the nominalists, as de Libera 
pointed out48.
Interestingly enough, and corroborating this analysis, Albert takes Porphyry’s 
alternatives in an already biased way, and this in favor of the intellect—and thus 
biased towards nominalism—, as the mere comparison between the sources will 
show:
Mox de generibus et speciebus illud quidem 
sive subsistunt sive in solis nudis purisque 
intellectibus posita sunt sive subsistentia 
corporalia sunt an incorporalia, et utrum 
separata an in sensibilibus […].
Porphyry, Isagoge Porphyrii 
Translatio Boethii, 149
[…] [A]n ista quae genera et species dicuntur, 
in re subsistant, aut non quidem in rerum natura 
sint subsistentia, sed in solis, nudis purisque 
intellectibus per abstractionem a rebus 
factam sint posita […] utrum corporalia sint 
an incorporalia […] utrum sint in sensibilibus 
singularibus suis posita secundum esse, an sint 
extra singularia in rationibus solis mathematicis, 
sicut dixisse Plato refertur.
Albertus Magnus, 
Super Porphyrium de V universalibus,
 II, cap. 2, p. 19-20 (my emphasis)
The philosopher of Cologne inserts in the problem what for him is a given, 
i.e. the abstraction, carried out by the intellect, of the universals from things 
(see emphasis above), and with this his intention of postulating the universals 
primarily or even «solely» in the intellect is already quite evident. One has to 
realize that Albert’s problem was far more complex than it may seem at first sight 
nowadays; he was a realist in the logico-epistemological sense because there was 
actually no easy way out of this for a Christian: the verb was true, it was part of 
the one person that was the trinity, and it was real, constituted by real res, namely 
48   Cf. A. de libera, «Théorie des universaux et réalisme logique chez Albert le Grand», Revue des 
sciences philosophiques et théologiques, 65 (1981), p. 56.
49   Ed. L. minio-Paluello, Corpus Philosophorum Medii Aevi, Aristoteles latinus I 6-7, Desclée de 
Brouwer, Bruges – Paris 1996, p. 5.
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by the res solae metaphysicae of many editions of the Super Porphyrium de V 
universalibus50, subsisting by themselves; but they would be nothing for us if 
they were not in our minds, too, and it is not at all easy to see how they would 
keep this substantial character once there. On the other hand, there is a world out 
there that is the expression of its creator, and the intellect somehow has to take 
that world into consideration; however, it is again the intellect that «actualizes» 
the universal, namely it is the possible intellect, «moved into actualization» by the 
agent one — just as color «moves» sight «into actualization»—, that «actualizes» 
the universality in the form51. 
It is important to retain in this that the agent intellect is said to be the cause of 
whatever form is in it, while the possible intellect is merely capable of knowing, 
and not of causing (cognitivus non causans)52; but one has to keep in mind that 
Albert claims, against the falâsifa, that each individual has his/her own agent 
intellect, therefore attributing «creative» powers to the individual mind, too. This 
«creation» is the in-formation of things, the giving of forms or essences to things, 
and we know that these are precisely the universals! The problem is thus one of 
a «double realism»: a realism «of creation» and «of universals» that is to a great 
extent incompatible with the mental character of the latter, an incompatibility 
that is actually solved by nominalism, which accepts the reality of the universals 
50   Editio Papiensis of ca. 1490, Editio Veneta of 1494, Editio Lugdunensis of 1651, and Editio 
Parisiensis of 1890. In the edition here used, the editor chose the expression rationes solae 
mathematicae instead of res solae metaphysicae (see quotation above), which for obvious 
reasons does not seem a good choice; moreover, Albert seems to place the former on a lower 
level in relation to the latter (Cf. Super Dionysium De divinis nominibus, cap. 1, n. 10, ed. P. 
simon, Opera Omnia XXXVII 1, Aschendorff, Münster 1972, p. 5).
51   Super Porphyrium II, c. 3, p. 24: «Per hoc autem quod est in intellectu, dupliciter consideratur, 
scilicet aut secundum relationem ad intellectum intelligentiae primae cognoscentis et causantis 
ipsum, cuius illa natura simplex radius quidam est ; aut secundum relationem ad intellectum 
per abstractionem cognoscentem ipsum. Et primo quidem modo accidit ipsi radium et lumen 
intelligentiae agentis esse et simplex et purum esse et immateriale et immobile et incorporale 
et incorruptibile et perfectibile intellectus possibilis, et eiusdem possibilis intellectus esse 
motivum ad actum, sicut color movet visum ad actum secundum actum lucidi, quod est in ipso, 
quando secundum actum color est. Secundum relationem autem, quam habet ad intellectum 
cognoscentem non causantem, habet quod talis intellectus, secundum quod abstrahit ipsum, “agit 
in ipso universalitatem” — quam de natura sua ante habuit — per hoc quod separat ipsum a 
materia et materialibus individuantibus ipsum. Et sic intelligitur quod dicit Aristoteles, quod 
“universale est dum intelligitur, particulare autem dum sentitur”. Et illud Avicennae dictum, 
quod intellectus in formis agit universalitatem».
52  Ibid.
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solely in the mind. This explains why Albert is neither a full-fledged realist nor 
an accomplished nominalist, and why his solution to the problem of universals is 
the double stance realist-nominalist balancing an «epistemological reduction» of 
the universal to the intellect with an «ontological non-reduction» that is not an 
autonomy or an independence of the former vis-à-vis the latter.
This duplicity has its origin undoubtedly, as shown, in his Christian 
background, but it does not make of Albert’s a sort of trinitarian dilemma, as 
defended by Alain de Libera53; Albert takes part in the problem of universals as a 
philosopher, and not, as de Libera’s interpretation suggests, as a theologian. Proof 
of this is that he comes forward with a very technical concept, that of aptitudo, in 
order to manage to balance his quotas of nominalism and realism: 
Per […] aptitudinem universale est in re extra, sed secundum actum existendi in multis 
non est nisi in intellectu: et ideo dixerunt Peripatetici quod universale non est nisi in intellectu, 
referentes hoc ad universale quod est in multis et de multis secundum actum existendi, et non 
secundum aptitudinem solam.
Liber de intellectu et intelligibili, II, 2, 493b54
So, Albert had a theological background that did not allow him to 
«completely» eliminate the universals in things, but how does one explain that 
Avicenna, while separating essence and existence55, kept them in that state, too? 
De Libera offers the plausible explanation that such an elimination would mean 
an «epistemological solipsism of the intention56», but this explanation has two 
shortcomings: it is 1) a psychological explanation, attributing to Avicenna the 
unconscious insight of the dangers of 2) what is best defined—against de Libera’s 
«euphemistic expression»—as an absolute idealism.
In spite of all his intellectualism, Albertus Magnus cannot be said to be an 
idealist, and this mainly because he lacks the «constitutionism» of his «disciple» 
Dietrich: although, as seen, he has the beginnings of an epistemological theory 
of the subject and of the object of knowledge, he does not have a theory of the 
«constitution» of the latter by the former. To some extent, this might be due to 
the fact that he, just like Avicenna, believed in the independence of the essence 
in relation to the existence: this is but an accident of the first; a single essence 
53  Cf. A. de libera «Théorie des universaux», art. cit., p. 69.
54  Venise 1494.
55  Cf. Avicenna, Logica, Venise 1508, f. 2rb.
56  Cf. A. de libera «Théorie des universaux», art. cit., p. 59.
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can have different modes of being, in other words, several beings, without being 
affected by any of them: 
Et ideo una et eadem est essentia in se et in anima et in singulari ; sed in anima secundum 
esse spirituale, in singulari secundum esse materiale et naturale, in se autem in esse simplici.
Albertus Magnus, Super Porphyrium II, c. 6, p. 35 
Against this, Dietrich of Freiberg will explicitly state that the essence of a 
thing necessarily entails its existence57; as a matter of fact, it is precisely because 
a thing exists that it has an essence, and this is nowhere but in the intellect:
Obiecta enim non habent rationem causae respectu intellectus in actu, tum quia ad 
ipsum non pervenit motio obiecti, cum ipse nec sit corpus nec virtus in corpore, sed quid 
separatum secundum Philosophum, tum quia in cognoscendo non praesupponitur obiectum 
secundum propriam rationem obiecti, qua possit movere intellectum et secundum hoc habere 
rationem causae, sed potius in cognoscendo incipit habere obiectum propriam rationem obiecti. 
Obiectum enim intellectus est quiditas secundum Philosophum vel res secundum rationem suae 
quiditatis; hanc autem nequaquam apprehendit intellectus nisi distinguendo et determinando 
eius propria principia, quae Philosophus vocat partes formae, quas significat definitio. 
Dietrich of Freiberg, De origine, 5, 2658 (my emphasis)
Summing up: although Albert was not an idealist, he actually opened the 
door to the idealism of some of his «disciples» with a strong intellectualism 
that, inside the problem of universals, placed the verb also in the human mind. 
Moreover, he carried out a major epistemological revolution when claiming that 
truth is the adequacy of the object to the mind, thus causing the swansong of the 
earlier medieval motto according to which veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus. 
Regarding more specifically the problem of universals, and namely his penchant 
for nominalism, his influence was huge and paved the way for more explicit 
forms of intellectualism, which, though they, too, do not end up forming idealist 
doctrines, show us the extremely intellectualist context in which late medieval 
idealism bloomed.
57   De ente et essentia II, 1, 4, ed. R. imbacH, Opera Omnia II, Felix Meiner Verlag, Hamburg 1980: 
«non possum intelligere essentiam hominis, nisi intelligam esse actuale eius».
58   De origine rerum praedicamentalium, ed. L. sturlese, Opera Omnia III, Felix Meiner Verlag, 
Hamburg 1983.
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